USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE TO MEET INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING NEEDS OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

by

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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The Army is a primary consumer of strategic intelligence for force structure and acquisition planning. At this level, the intelligence process integrates economic, political, military, environmental, technological and social information for use in assessments and forecasts. These products are pivotal to strategy formulation and development of supporting planning for future requirements. Relevant information must be collected, integrated, assessed and distributed to planners. Yet sometimes these efforts fail to have the desired impact on planning. Failure to effectively exploit the intelligence systems in planning is not a new problem, but it is one that deserves a fresh look in the wake of the complex, post-September 11th environment. The Army, today, must prepare to support a more diverse array of joint missions than ever before. This paper will examine the frequency, impacts and underlying causes of intelligence failures. It will examine changes in the planning process, which will impact intelligence requirements and suggest to problems identified. The traditional approach to long range planning is to construct representative scenarios and plan against them. Today, services are moving closer to joint capabilities-based planning. When this change occurs the impact will be profound. The Army Intelligence process should anticipate this change.

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE TO MEET INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING NEEDS OF THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

History is littered with wars, which everybody knew would never happen.

—Enoch Powell

The Army's lack of effective strategic intelligence capability is incongruent with the objectives for transformation in the twenty first century. If the Army is to be relevant for achieving national interests, it must be prepared for the future. This future has many uncertainties that entail both risks and opportunities. Intelligence can't predict the future but it can help shape the future, by providing forecasts to enable sound decision-making based on anticipated defense requirements. The world is in a state of change unlike any period in the past. Defense planning methodology is changing as well. Army intelligence has an opportunity to assume a greater role in impacting the military forces for the future. To seize this opportunity, the Army as a whole must take a decisive role in refocusing its intelligence mission from one that is primarily tactical to one which embraces the strategic level. Army intelligence is capable of rising to this challenge - but only if it is tasked, and resourced to do so. In the past, strong institutional bias and inertia have counter-acted evolution toward a greater level of responsibility for the Army in strategic intelligence. The job of integrating strategic intelligence needs to be a core responsibility for the Army. This paper identifies impediments to change, suggests remedies and recommends a possible format for a resulting Army strategic intelligence product.

BACKGROUND

The aim of intelligence is to seek the advantage in anticipated circumstances, whether today or five years from now. Intelligence is vital to any nation's security. A dictum from former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates states that "Intelligence deals with secrets, rather than mysteries: 'secrets are things that are potentially knowable, while in mysteries there are no clear-cut answers".[1] Broad conceptualizations about future military capabilities are of little use, unless those considerations provide answers to real challenges to be faced in the future. Intelligence gives the long-range planner the confidence to make the best decisions possible in order to implement national strategy.

Intelligence is of dubious value unless it can correctly impact decision cycles in a meaningful and relevant way. Clausewitz was notably skeptical of the value of intelligence. He states; " Many intelligence reports are contradictory; even more are false, and most are

uncertain." [2] More recently, John Keegan wrote in Intelligence in War that intelligence, accurate or not, matters little because decisive outcomes are determined largely by force. Bruce Hoffman, of RAND disagrees with Keegan's historical analysis, in the context of America's present-day struggle against trans-national threats, given the current level of American intelligence sophistication.[3] America is not lacking in terms of pure power; military, diplomatic, or economic. Its' resolve is being tested by enemies who can use surprise as a strategic weapon. To defeat this enemy and maintain security, America must make maximum use of its other strength the ability to exploit information.

The aim of strategic intelligence is to forecast trends in military affairs, economics, politics, demographics and technology and synthesize them into a big picture for defense officials. According to Bruce Berkowitz, " strategic intelligence has a wider base and broader objective [than tactical or operational], intelligence "[4] Traditionally, the services have focused on tactical and operational intelligence. Tactical and operational intelligence deal primarily with immediate threats. The Army left strategic intelligence to higher echelons. Some authorities, such as former CIA director Stansfield Turner believe that the services should stay out of the strategic intelligence business, altogether.[5] This may be a shortsighted view, because the services need to provide forces offering strategic capabilities, not simply tactical forces aligned to expected threats.

Intelligence fulfills a broad range of national requirements, but the focus relevant to this paper is planning. The United States has unparalleled capability to produce quality intelligence. A more exacting standard of analysis is needed in order to pinpoint weaknesses and fix them. The process by which strategic level intelligence is managed and applied can be refined to better shape an Army meeting the ever more challenging problems of the twenty first century.

THE RECORD OF INTELLIGENCE AND PLANNING

Review of the record of intelligence indicates some successes and some failures, and lost opportunities. The ultimate aim of intelligence and planning integration is to achieve surprise while avoiding being surprised. At the policy level, intelligence process failure may result in strategic surprise. According to Douglas Dearth, strategic surprise has three components; diplomatic, technological and military strategic.[6] Such surprise results from the failure to uncover or respond to decisive information, or from the failure to protect critical information.

One famous example of military surprise is Pearl Harbor. Information was available yet failed to influence the decision cycle to prepare for the immediate attack. Examined from the angle of long-term planning, however, the US Navy considered the strategic threat in the Pacific

and designed a force to counter the Japanese far in advance of Pearl Harbor. Though Pearl Harbor was a tragic tactical outcome it did not prevent the US from achieving decisive victory in the Pacific because adequate strategic intelligence had enabled the Navy to plan for the War in the Pacific.

The events of September 11, 2001 are a different story. The attacks of 9-11 once again reflected a failure to respond adequately to warnings of a probable attack. Good strategic intelligence about Al Qaeda had not translated into an appropriate posture. The US discovered it was unprepared to counter a well coordinated but decentralized trans- national threat of this magnitude. The true capability and intent of Al Qaeda to achieve catastrophic results remained unappreciated below the upper echelons of government. Before 9-11, homeland defense and counter-terrorism were integrated into US planning - but without much weight. US Military forces were clearly being postured to deal with regional hegemony, peer competitors, and balance of power politics. Little resource or preparation was given to dealing with trans-national threats.

The subsequent 2001, overthrow of the Taliban and defeat of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan provide an example of the ability of intelligence to decisively influence the application of military power at the strategic level. Culpability was assigned rapidly, and the Americans were quick to exploit the knowledge gained from previous CIA participation in the Afghan struggle against the Russians in the 1980s. Although the US had no war plan suited for application to this situation, it had detailed knowledge about the enemy, terrain and allies.[7] This information helped the US plan a unique campaign that mixed force assets to provide new capabilities. This case serves to illustrate how intelligence information can be used effectively at the strategic level in execution and by extrapolation it also applies to long range planning.

Many authors have tallied scorecards that show successes and failures in utilizing intelligence to national advantage.[8] It is not important here to recite the statistics. It is, however, important to know why processes fail or succeed. One grandiose failure, or a series of smaller ones could be enough to end America's predominance as a guarantor of democracy and potentially threaten it's own survival. "An army or state succumbs quickest to paralysis of the brain", says B.H. Liddell Hart. [9] Strategic surprise is always waiting for the complacent.

THE CURRENT STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

The process by which intelligence is managed impacts its utility in the planning process. Since Intelligence is expensive, exhaustive and perishable it must be managed through long term life cycle management. The phases of the cyclical process are: planning and direction,

collection, processing, production and analysis, and dissemination.[10] A hierarchy and organization for intelligence activities have evolved within the US government executive branch since the passage of The National Security Act in 1947. The process of producing intelligence is financially monitored and controlled by congress. Compartmentalization has been a primary feature of US intelligence, with the intent being to provide safeguard against misuse. All US intelligence activities are coordinated, but not completely integrated, by the Director of Central Intelligence. This includes fourteen organizations. Intelligence activities are organized to serve various echelons of government including, National Command Authority, Department of Defense, The JCS, combatant commanders, the individual services, national law enforcement and other government departments. The DOD is the largest consumer of intelligence information. The National Security Council (NSC) prepares a list of national interests for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to focus overall collection and analysis activities . The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is key in establishing priorities within the defense community. Army HQDA, G2 integrates intelligence products for use in Army studies and analyses. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) aids this headquarters element in developing requested products. The Army uses the intelligence products to support force structure development, modernization and acquisition programs.[11]

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the primary vehicle through which the upper echelons of the intelligence community communicate with senior policy makers at the National Command Authority (NCA) level. There is no set agenda for production of the NIEs. Often they are produced at the request of policy makers. The result is that somewhere between 15 and 25 are produced in a given year. These documents focus on strategic level forecasts and analysis of implications. Considered authoritative, they represent the best, combined judgments of experts. The goal is to reach consensus, but that does not always happen. Cases of dissent are noted, but it is doubtful that much weight is given to the minority opinion by decision-makers.[12] The NIEs represent intelligence focused at key policy questions. They represent the first layer of intelligence supporting national decision-making.

THE ROLE OF DEFENSE AND SERVICE INTELLIGENCE

Another layer of intelligence is focused specifically on defense requirements. Most of the money spent on intelligence in the United States is focused on Defense. Currently, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) scopes the mission for military intelligence application, through its role defining threat environments for Joint threat-based scenarios. Service level intelligence

organizations participate in this process, but are mainly focused on the development of tactical and operational intelligence. For example, Army Intelligence devotes most of its resources to Army analytical studies. The service intelligence agencies have the additional role of providing the intelligence input to the defense planning scenarios. During this process situational assumptions and parameters are developed by the service designated as the lead for each planning scenario.

THE EVOLVING LONG RANGE PLANNING ENVIRONMENT

Past planning efforts rely on a stable environment. In the 1960s "strategic planning" was envisioned as a way to achieve a specific future, or realize specific goals. Of course, actual cause and effect is difficult to establish. Historians are left with the task of making and testing hypotheses about policy and consequence. With this caveat, it can be asserted that strategic planning and the necessary intelligence to support it won the cold war. An alternative to preparing for a single most-likely future is to prepare to capitalize on opportunities and to seek to posture against a wide range of possible adverse conditions. The latter type of planning works best in conditions of uncertainty, and is the type favored by the Department of Defense today. The intelligence community will need to apply its tools to supporting this type of planning in the future.

THE PRIOR ERAS (1947-2001)

During the Cold war, planners dealt with the threat of a major global conflict of epic proportion between superpowers and with smaller conflicts stemming from this primary struggle. With the demise of the Soviet Union came a strategy focused on defeating two regional powers. Later, more attention was paid to smaller conflicts and requirements because of their increasing importance to every day national security concerns. Taken as a whole, this period was anything but static. To be sure, there were surprises. However, national security environment changes occurred along predictable lines. The military planning focus remained threat-based, even though it's guiding documents increasingly reflected the need to address full spectrum problems.

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 01 GUIDANCE

The analysis conducted in 2000 convinced OSD that a major methodological shift was needed in determining requirements for US military forces. Therefore, in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), major emphasis was placed on the need to change from threat-based to capabilities-based analyses. QDR 2001 noted that changes in the geopolitical environment

and wide spread military-technological changes were increasing the potential for miscalculation and surprise. Implied in the QDR and in all defense planning is the need to balance risk with cost.[13] Rather than anticipate a set of specified threats, this type of analysis focuses on determining the range of strategic capabilities a military force needs to conduct its over-all mission. The QDR 2001 analysis used a combination of threat-based and capabilities-based approaches. Emerging capabilities included; advanced remote sensing, long-range precision strike, revolutionary maneuver/expeditionary concepts and anti-access mitigation systems.[14]

IMPACT OF SEPT 11

Granted, the United States was unprepared for the events of Sept 11th 2001, but it reacted quickly. With QDR 2001, the Department of Defense had, in fact, laid out the methodology needed to create the military for the twenty-first century, even if the full extent of future challenges hadn't been realized at the time. The missing element in the QDR 2001 analysis was the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The situation emphasized the need for new capabilities, available in flexible, modular organizations to fight a global campaign against a trans-national threat, which used asymmetric means for conducting warfare. Changing US strategies resulting from Sept 11th have also altered relationships with our allies. Even as US military power grows, a divergence of interests among other nations is taking place globally. The degree to which other nations back US efforts will have an impact on the effectiveness of the elements of power used to confront new enemies and situations.

EMERGING GUIDANCE

The Secretary of Defense is currently publishing the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), which will replace the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). This document will specify programmatic guidance and coordinate the force development processes of the services. This guidance will help achieve a unified military force and determine the rate of change to the transformed force. In the past services supported joint commanders, but did not usually integrate. This is changing today. Consequently, there must be corresponding changes to the way in which force management is conducted by the services. The Army will need to consider its role in the joint context. Army intelligence will need to help verify the Army's role in the new force by collecting and analyzing information related to the new capabilities required by the joint force. [15]

CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING

Threat-based planning has been used since Robert McNamara instituted the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1962. [16] Threat-based planning develops forces in response to threats deemed plausible at the level of the top policy makers. The disadvantage of this approach is that it tends to create overmatch in response to a few situations while largely ignoring all the other potential challenges on the horizon. Capabilities-based planning is envisioned to replace threat-based planning. As defined by Paul K. Davis it is "... Planning under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern day challenges and circumstances, while working in an economic framework". [17] This methodology specifies a range of security challenges facing the US in terms of scenarios representing potential applications of force. QDR 2001 highlighted challenges such as enemies employing surprise, deception and asymmetric methods as prime examples for treatment. [18] Within each scenario, the emerging challenges are represented and compared. Trade-offs between risk and cost are examined to make choices about capabilities to meet the challenges identified. The resulting force will be the one which best accommodates cost-benefit analysis.

CHANGING WORLD VIEWS

It is a paradox that the world, which is seemingly growing together, is also growing apart simultaneously. Globalization is changing the rate of travel, speed of communications and the efficiency of economics through technological innovation and the development of mass capital markets. However, the underlying currents affect the shape of the present era as well. These patterns are being reshaped .by the new relationships and technology of today. Environmental degradation and health threats are becoming more significant issues in international affairs. The end of Cold War alignments has heralded many changes. Widening social inequity has fueled resentment by the less fortunate against the western economic powers. New freedoms are being used to pursue old ethnic rivalries and to spur more recent clashes over resources. Terrorism is the last recourse of those who feel abandoned or threatened by the new changes taking place internationally. Those who despise globalization often see it as "Americanization", and therefore focus their animosity on US Interests in retaliation. In addition, methods for applying weapons of mass destruction have proliferated. This is the world, which Intelligence must investigate in order to help policy makers and planners develop and implement strategy.

THE EVOLVING INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT

Integration of policy focus, strategic planning and intelligence activities is difficult for a variety of reasons. Intelligence met the requirements of Cold War planning by focusing on the

strategic capacity of the Soviet Union and in understanding its aim to spread the system of Marxist-Leninism throughout the world. The mission was complicated, and the foe insidious, but the threat was at least easy to identify. Intelligence assets could be targeted. The Soviet nuclear capability warranted highly technical means of surveillance, still largely intact today. Budget cuts in response to the 1990's Peace Dividend contributed to a shortage of reliable human intelligence sources and gradual de-emphasis of its role in forming an over-all intelligence picture.

As the cold war ended, larger threats became more regionally focused. Smaller threats, of an ethnic nature, began to occupy more of the Army's time but received scant amounts of intelligence attention. Intelligence was still focused on using highly sophisticated satellite technology to monitor larger threats. Most requests to Army intelligence for information supporting studies and analyses focused on enemy and allied force data used to feed the intensive and complex combat modeling process. To support Twenty-first century force planning this focus must adapt. In this environment, intelligence assets need to uncover decentralized terrorist networks and their support infrastructures, identify their regime partners, recruitment bases, sources of weapons, and pinpoint US and allied vulnerabilities.

PROBLEMS WITH THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

Intelligence activities are conducted according to the needs articulated by policy-makers and planners. In the past decade, this process has been rather disjointed for Army planners. Shifting priorities, and lack of process responsiveness have made achieving effective integration difficult. The Army's on-going transformation efforts exacerbate problems. Some key integration problems are identified in this section. These problems will have to be solved or mitigated, if intelligence is to fully support planning in the future.

POINT OF VIEW

A major difficulty for planners using intelligence developed from national sources is that the research area defined for such intelligence is inherently political. Without policy definition American national intelligence would be directionless. The focus of such intelligence may be strongly associated with current political issues and debate. This is not to say that intelligence is necessarily used to justify policy. Instead, it is hoped that intelligence will help change existing policy, even when it is in conflict with firmly held opinion. National intelligence activities need to be rooted in a firm understanding of national policy considerations. The complication for the planner who must use intelligence derived from politically inspired sources is that it may not fit the context of strategic planning analysis for two reasons. First, the degree of coverage

may be inadequate. Secondly, the underlying assumption may be inappropriate for the planning concern in question.

A CUMBERSOME PROCESS

The process in which planners and Army intelligence analysts work together to support the development of Army planning cycle requirements is not synchronized or prioritized to produce realistic and timely results. Intelligence analysts must wait while planners debate the specifications for the intelligence product that will support analysis. This inevitably consumes valuable time needed for comprehensive intelligence assessment. When the Army intelligence analysts finally receive the formal request for products, the only prioritization given is usually in favor of products associated with data for high-end combat scenarios which are the focus of the Army's major combat simulations used in the planning cycle. Other full spectrum scenarios are accorded lesser status by planners. As a result, these scenarios are often ignored altogether in the intelligence assessment. Numerous redirections from planners can be expected, which further reduce the time available to complete the product. Since planning analysis timelines can slip only so much, the planners may not wait for the completion of current intelligence products. Instead, the planning analyses may move forward using out of date and incomplete intelligence. This is regrettable, because valuable opportunities to influence the planning cycle with relevant information are then lost.

A BIASED APPROACH

Intelligence forecasts are heavily weighted by experience. This introduces bias when old assumptions no longer apply. The strategic situation in the world is currently in a state of continual change. The future is not like the past because there are mechanisms of change at work nullifying or altering factors, which previously held great relevance. The trends observed today are being altered by the time they are noticed. An intelligence analyst, unmindful of this acceleration of change is preparing for conditions under an erroneous strategic framework. Army analysts in general are not necessarily trained to think strategically and Army intelligence analysts are no exception. The intelligence analyst, like his\her operational counterpart, tends to think in operational and tactical terms. Common to analysts in general, Army intelligence analysts focus heavily on deductive reasoning to develop assessments. A well-worn analytical framework may fail to detect broad underlying circumstances of history, which may invalidate the premises of models employed. The preferred model bias among Army intelligence analysts is for inter-state, balance of power models. This type of model postulates regional hostility based on relative difference in military power between traditional nation-states. These models

are based on well-established political science theory. Little weight is placed on destabilizing economic, social, or other factors important to the Army today. These factors, which may cause instability to occur within states, are the basis for intra-state conflict models. Intelligence analysts do not usually attempt the use of intra-state conflict theory, because no accepted approach has been endorsed by academics in the field. Similarly trans-national factors receive little treatment, for the same reasons. Trans-national threats, of course, are of great concern because they include global terrorism. As a consequence, some of the most pressing problems of today are overlooked in Army analyses conducted using available intelligence.

TOO MUCH (TOO LITTLE) INFORMATION

Making sense of the mass of information available today presents new opportunities but also creates greater challenges. [19] Vital indications may go unnoticed because they are drowned in background noise. Douglas Dearth notes that competition from open-source media is changing the focus of intelligence.[20] More information is better than less, but presents additional problems. Information must be sorted and evaluated. Contradictions are bound to occur. When they do, they may need to be investigated fully.

In spite of the large volume of information available, missing information can lead to false conclusions. Despots, criminals and terrorists are becoming increasingly aware of this shortcoming. In order to be successful, they are becoming masters of information deception. By adopting sophisticated methods to avoid exposure and relay false information. For example, they avoid communication methods that have proven vulnerable but find ways to relay information without detection.

In order for intelligence to be successful, information must be shared. Secret information is safeguarded by nations to prevent exposure of sources, attracting attention and divulging sensitive facts. However, lack of trust may thwart effective communications. Inside the United States there are also organizational and legal barriers to information flow. The is especially true in the area of homeland security, were domestic legal constraints not only prevent the Department of Defense collecting intelligence at home, but also deny information storage authority crucial to studies. There are valid reasons for such caution, but the restrictions do constrain the Army's ability to identify requirements effectively for support at home. Denial of information flow restricts development of a common operating picture.

STILL THREAT BASED

Threat based-analysis inevitably leads to over emphasis on specific scenarios. Forces developed for these scenarios may be limited in responsiveness to changing conditions. Just

as Army planning has been slow to embrace capabilities-based planning, Army intelligence has been slow to adapt. Most efforts are still focused on developing detailed order of battle assessments of conventional and unconventional forces belonging to state regimes. While generation of this type of information remains an important primary product, more comprehensive global intelligence, as yet, remains undeveloped. Recent experience shows that operations are becoming more complex and may focus on multiple missions simultaneously or in sequence. The Army needs to know what type problems may be experienced in those operations.

SOLUTIONS TO INTELLIGENCE PROCESS PROBLEMS

The problems described in the last section are challenging but they are not insurmountable. A more responsive and adaptive intelligence service can be achieved by executing a number of institutional and technical changes described in this section.

SENSING STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Intelligence assessment must help the long-range planner be relevant to the national interests and concerns expressed by policy makers. As discussed, the policy maker must establish the strategic direction for national security policy before the intelligence analyst can investigate the world in the context of national objectives. The emergence of capabilities-based planning is an opportunity to mitigate some of the discomfort associated with past forecasting approaches. If the intelligence analyst takes the concerns expressed by the policy maker, as reflected in the National Security Strategy, and focuses strategic intelligence on ways in which American goals might be achieved or missed, then challenges for the future can be identified and used by planners as a basis for determining capabilities to meet those challenges. A major question is whether service level intelligence is relevant to long range planning. The answer is yes. While the Army doesn't necessarily need its own strategic intelligence collection process, it does need to establish its own integration and analysis capability. Army intelligence needs to study the available strategic intelligence and identify and relay disconnects to intelligence services at higher levels. Army planners need an interpretation of the available data that is focused on the problem of providing land power requirements.

STREAMLINING THE PROCESS

The problem of getting relevant intelligence into the planning cycle is exacerbated by a highly bureaucratic style of management. In the past Army planners and intelligence analysts have tried to change the process. Policy makers have been urged to do a better job initially

defining and prioritizing the planning cycle program objectives. Planners have been provided with detailed explanations of time required for products and indications of how revisions affect timelines. However, these prescriptive measures have not improved synchronization. The solution lies not in more control but rather fewer constraints. The ability of the Army's intelligence organization to react to planner's requests is hampered by restrictive policies that prevent vital initial preparation work. These policies are intended to limit the power of intelligence organizations and thus limit potential for abuse of power. This is an essential control in democracies, but could be achieved without reducing intelligence organizational ability to prepare and respond quickly. Army intelligence needs to be freed from operating inside of narrowly defined tasks and be more ready once tasks are received. Without such freedom, gaining a strategic perspective in Army analysis will be difficult. Clearly, Army intelligence needs the power to take more initiative in this area.

DEVELOPING AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH

Army Intelligence analysts need to be trained and encouraged to begin accounting for the strategic realm. Properly trained analysts will be able to account for the political, economic, diplomatic, social and environmental factors, which may impact how and when land-forces may be committed. Army intelligence analysts have a strong cultural view that considers action directed at influencing policy to be taboo. This traditional point of view keeps Army intelligence focused on the operational and tactical world. The strategic realm is seen as outside the scope of responsibility. The Army has done little, so far, to encourage a change of this mindset. Tactical and operational intelligence obviously should not go away, but needs to be approached from a strategic context. A strategic approach would help eliminate the current myopic focus. From the perspective of an Army intelligence analyst, a strategic viewpoint is a more objective one.

THE RIGHT INFORMATION

Better methods are needed to filter the vast amount of information available today. Improvements in information technology and artificial intelligence may improve the speed and credibility of conclusions reached. Used correctly, these tools may ensure that vital connective evidence does not go unnoticed. The tools may also be important in identifying deception measures and to analyze the communications patterns of hostile entities. Information fusion requires developing lateral relationships with foreign intelligence services and developing a spirit of trust to facilitate free sharing of information to get a better picture from the global perspective. Lines of communication need to be opened with international and non-governmental

organizations. Such organizations may need to be persuaded that, where ethically possible, cooperation with the US Army is confidential and non-detrimental to their own interests. From the perspective of homeland security, the legal questions regarding access to domestic information need to be solved. Secure information fusion centers need to be established to allow greater sharing of material while continuing to guard the sensitive aspects of the associated data.

SUPPORT CAPABILITIES BASED PLANNING

Army intelligence needs to support capabilities-based analysis. There is little pay-off to modeling levels of complexity that do not reduce uncertainty. Even under a new planning regime, the Army will still use large combat simulation models requiring data in order to test and verify capabilities, identified by the Joint Staff as critical. Recent operational experiences suggest that theater analysis will need to go beyond tactical and operational focus. When this happens, inputs requiring intelligence assessments and forecasts could be refocused at the strategic level, allowing Army long-range planners to test the strategic capabilities and concepts envisioned for the future Army. As a consequence, Army intelligence analysts will be freed to devote more time to studying emerging trends and examining impact of capabilities across the new mission spectrum. There are many mission environments that deserve greater treatment by intelligence efforts. The Army intelligence community should begin to identify the kinds of factors, which must be studied.

RESULTING FOCUS SHIFT FOR ARMY INTELLIGENCE

The Army needs to address its missing strategic intelligence picture. An intelligence forecast specifically focused on factors in land-based operations should be prepared. The forecast should be published to coincide with the Army planning cycle. It should cover the period for the long term planning horizon. This horizon might perhaps go out as far as twenty year, with the caveat that forecasts at the outer edge are more indefinite. At a minimum, the assessment should contain four major sections. The first section should be a discussion of US policy from all of the major guidance documents. The second section should address geopolitical factors affecting stability. Both time and geography are of critical concern. The third section should address threats to global stability. Each threat should be examined from the perspective of underlying causes and intents. A concluding section should describe the interaction between policy, geopolitical factors and threats. The result should provide a basis from which to address the future product requirement coming from the Army planners. The assessment should contain an analysis of the factors similar to those contained in Table 1.0.

This recommendation has been formulated by examining trends such as those described in Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century. [21]

Description of US Policy	Geopolitical Factors	Threats
- Engagement - Preemption	- Economic Disparity - Birthrate - Environmental Conditions - Distribution of Resources - Health - Ethnic\Religious Friction - Political Continuity - Refugees\Displaced Persons - New Technologies	-Sources of WMD Proliferation -Spread of Terrorist Cells -Extent of Organized Crime -Identify Rouge States -Identify Non-State Actors -Identify Hostile Alliances -Identify Peer Competitors -New Technologies -Narcotics Trade

TABLE 1.0 STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FORMAT

BENEFITS FROM ARMY INTELLIGENCE REFOCUS

SUPPORT OF STUDIES AND ANALYSES

The intelligence picture is often the first requirement for Army studies. Many of the critical study assumptions are based on intelligence products. The forecast recommended in the previous section should provide greater fidelity to defining missions, types of forces, manning requirements, training requirements, lift requirements and doctrine associated with points on the planning horizon. The suggested assessment will define a clearer picture of the factors to be weighted in risk analysis. If applied in a timely manor, this intelligence assessment will improve the quality of on-going Army studies and increase their level of credibility within the Department of Defense.

SCENARIOS FOR THE PLANNING PROCESS

Although the focus of planning in the future will be capabilities-based analysis, scenarios will also be needed to establish a range of capabilities. Army intelligence will still be tasked to help define realistic test cases across the spectrum of conflict. Planners will not require dominant scenarios, such as those developed for the Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) of the past decade. Instead, ranges of scenarios reflecting the global economic, military, political and social trends studied in the recommended intelligence assessment. Some detailed scenarios will still be needed to develop land power concepts and will require appropriate intelligence synthesis efforts. The Army should make involvement in scenario development a

high priority and not a mission supported only when human resources are not otherwise engaged, as is too often the case. This kind of neglect has been harmful to the Army's force development process in the past Simulation testing using detailed scenarios is not dead. Capabilities-based forces will require greater numbers of simulation models run variations than used previously because more alternative futures will exist from a planner's perspective. Army intelligence analysts will be crucial in determining which branches, and sequels to examine.

BETTER FOCUSNG OF RESOURCES AND ASSETS

Freed from constraint and able to employ strategic initiative, Army intelligence would have greater opportunity to satisfy planning requirements at the strategic level. If Army intelligence could develop its own strategic plan for meeting intelligence requirements, vigorously pursue it, and apply findings to both anticipated and unscheduled requests for analysis, intelligence would have a greater impact on Army analysis. Ultimately, the changes proposed here would better meet the expectations of policy makers more fully than does the present process. Under a less restrictive arrangement than previously afforded, Army intelligence would have greater role in defining its own internal collection, integration, analysis, and distribution requirements. Greater responsibility would provide an incentive to use resources more effectively. Successful implementation of these recommendations could provide more responsive intelligence input to Army studies by providing a comprehensive pool of resources and experience from which to draw when needed.

CONCLUSION - ACHIEVING POLICY, PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE LINKAGE

With projected changes in force management, the Army has an opportunity to realign its intelligence products to meet the needs of twenty first century planning. Information is one the four elements of national power, along with the military, diplomatic and economic. Acquiring information and using it effectively, can enhance potency of the three other elements. Yet for years, the Army has lacked a significant strategic intelligence capability for developing information. In today's environment, it cannot continue without one. Significant changes are underway in the defense establishment. These changes coincide with an opportunity to make changes in the Army Intelligence process to support Army planners engaged in the planning cycle development. Yet, the Army intelligence community does not have the means or the authority to radically over-haul itself. The Army, as a whole, needs to change how it views and uses its intelligence organizations. Policy makers and long-range planners need to work with Army Intelligence organizations to achieve smoother cooperation. This transformation can be accomplished by giving greater levels of trust and responsibility to Army Intelligence.

Corresponding levels of resources will be needed to bring this proposal into effect. The result will be an intelligence system better able to integrate with the planning process.

WORD COUNT= 6021

ENDNOTES

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